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Abstract—Jamming refers to the deletion, corruption or dam-
age of meter measurements that prevents their further usage.
This is distinct from adversarial data injection that changes meter
readings while preserving their utility in state estimation. This
paper presents a generalized attack regime that uses jamming of
secure and insecure measurements to greatly expand the scope
of common ‘hidden’ and ‘detectable’ data injection attacks in
literature. For ‘hidden’ attacks, it is shown that with jamming,
the optimal attack is given by the minimum feasible cut in a
specific weighted graph. More importantly, for ‘detectable’ data
attacks, this paper shows that the entire range of relative costs for
adversarial jamming and data injection can be divided into three
separate regions, with distinct graph-cut based constructions for
the optimal attack. Approximate algorithms for attack design are
developed and their performances are demonstrated by simula-
tions on IEEE test cases. Further, it is proved that prevention
of such attacks require security of all grid measurements. This
work comprehensively quantifies the dual adversarial benefits of
jamming: (a) reduced attack cost and (b) increased resilience to
secure measurements, that strengthen the potency of data attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
State Estimation in a vital component for robust control
of power system and efficient electricity market operations. It
involves collection of measurements from meters distributed
across the grid that are communicated through SCADA (Su-
pervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems and then
using them for determining the system state. Presence of faster
sampling meters like phasor measurement units (PMUs) [1]
and Wide-Area Monitoring and Control Systems has led to
greater data collection and heightened focus on reliable state
estimation. This is because these new meters and their digital
communication expose the grid to adversarial data attacks.
Adversaries, often cyber in nature, can coordinately change
meter readings to produce an incorrect state estimate that can
subsequently result in grid failures and sub-optimal electricity
prices. In fact, practical adversarial attacks have been widely
studied in research (‘Aurora’ test attack [4], PMU timing attack
[5]) and also reported in national media (cyberspying [2],
‘Dragonfly’ virus [3]). There has thus been a surge in recent
research aimed at identifying power grid vulnerabilities and
designing resilience to adversarial attacks.
The authors of [6] were along the first to identify the
problem of ‘hidden’ data attacks that can change the state
estimate by bypassing bad-data detection checks at the esti-
mator. The central idea behind ‘hidden’ attacks in [6] is the
design of a vector of data injections in the column space of
the measurement matrix used in state estimation. Different
adversarial goals (Eg. minimizing number of compromised
measurements, minimum attack energy and cost) and operating
conditions (Eg. type of measurements, power flow model,
presence of secure measurements) have led to diverse research
approaches to the problem of optimal attack construction.
For adversaries interested in minimizing the number of mea-
surement corruptions in a DC-power flow based estimator,
[7] uses a l0 − l1 relaxation based framework to design
the optimal ‘hidden’ attack, while [8] uses mixed integer
linear programming. For state estimation relying on voltage
phasor and line flow measurements (collected from PMUs),
[9], [10] provide a graph-cut based ‘hidden’ attack framework.
Similarly, [14] discuss conditions for feasible data attack on
a Kalman-Filter based estimator for AC power flow systems.
For the related problem of preventing data attacks, techniques
discussed in literature include heuristic scheme [11], greedy
schemes [7], [10] among others.
Aside from the mentioned research on ‘hidden’ attacks,
a recent line of work has analyzed ‘detectable’ data attacks
that affect state estimation despite failing bad-data detection
checks. An attacker in this case prevents the bad-data re-
mover from removing some/all of the tempered measurements
from the system. In this context, reference [12] demonstrates
the construction of a basic ‘detectable’ attack (termed ‘data
integrity’ attack) by using half of the measurements in the
optimal ‘hidden’ attack, and by damaging the rest. The state
estimator here removes only the damaged measurements as
bad-data while the other half manipulated by the adversary
passes the bad-data detection test and causes the attack.
Reference [13] generalizes this technique by creating ‘de-
tectable’ attacks from graph cuts that may include a minority
of incorruptible measurements. This generalization produces
even greater reduction in attack cost (minimum being 50%)
over ‘hidden’ attack costs. More importantly, the framework in
[13] produces feasible ‘detectable’ attacks in systems secure
against all ‘hidden’ attacks. In this paper, we analyze both
attack regimes: ‘hidden’ and ‘detectable’ for adversaries that
have an additional tool: measurement jamming.
By jamming, we refer to any adversarial action that pre-
vents the state estimator from receiving or using a particular
measurement. Jamming may be conducted by several practical
techniques including wireless jammers, GPS spoofers, coordi-
nated Denial of Service attack [15] or even by physical damage
to the device, meter and communication equipment [16].
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Though jamming attacks have been implemented in research,
there are few studies analyzing their impact on constructing
optimal adversarial attacks. References [17] and [18] use
jamming of flow measurements with attack on breaker statuses
to design topology attacks on state estimation. The authors of a
recent paper [19] have used measurement jamming to design
‘detectable’ attacks. However, [19] limits adversarial action
to insecure measurements and leaves encrypted measurements
untouched. Though secure/encrypted measurements are indeed
secure against data injection, they are jammable (Eg. though
meter damage). Including jamming of secure measurements
into the attack framework thus generalizes ‘detectable’ and
‘hidden’ attacks, and enables a complete analysis of the effect
of jamming on attack cost and grid resilience. This is the
principal focus of this work.
We develop a graph-theoretic framework to study gener-
alized ‘hidden’ and ‘detectable’ data attacks by an adversary
equipped with three techniques. They include: (a) jamming
and (b) data injection in insecure measurements, and (c)
jamming of secure measurements. The distinct costs of these
techniques will depend on the adversarial instruments and
algorithms used for their implementation and measurement
security available in the grid. Despite the possible variation
in exact costs, we show that the design of the optimal attack
depends only on the relative costs of jamming and injection.
In particular, we show that
• for ‘hidden’ attacks, the optimal generalized attack is
given by the solution to a minimum weight graph-cut
problem on a weighted graph, for all permissible costs of
jamming and data injection;
• for ‘detectable’ attacks, the range of costs for the jam-
ming and data injection tools can be divided into three
intervals based on their relative values (Fig. 5). In each
cost region, the optimal generalized attack is constructed
by solving at most two minimum weight constrained
graph-cut problems specific to that interval.
It needs to be mentioned that if jamming is limited to insecure
measurements, the optimal ‘detectable’ attack is described by
two cost intervals [19] with one graph-cut problem each, un-
like three cost intervals, each with two optimization problems
here. As the constrained graph cut problems are in general
not solvable in polynomial time, we give iterative min-cut
based approximate algorithms that can be used for attack
construction. Simulations on IEEE test cases elucidate cost
improvements produced by our generalized attack framework
over traditional data attacks.
The second significant result of this paper states that our
generalized attacks are feasible even in systems with only one
insecure measurement. Preventing them requires extending
security to all measurements. Our attack framework is thus
more potent than previously studied ‘hidden’ [9], [10] and
‘detectable’ attacks [13], [19] that can be prevented with much
less number of secure measurements as detailed later.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section presents a description of the system models used in
state estimation, bad-data removal and considered adversarial
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Fig. 1. IEEE 14-bus test system [20]
tools and attack types. Traditional ‘hidden’ and ‘detectable’
attack regimes that involve manipulation of insecure measure-
ments are discussed in Section III. Next, our generalized attack
framework for ‘hidden’ and ‘detectable’ attacks is presented
in Section IV along with graph-theoretic formulations to
study the effect of different adversarial costs on the optimal
attack design. The algorithms to design the optimal ‘hidden’
and ‘detectable’ generalized attacks are given in Section V.
Simulations of the proposed algorithms on IEEE bus systems
for a range of jamming and bad-data injection costs and
comparisons with existing work are shown in Section VI.
Finally, concluding remarks are presented in Section VII.
II. STATE ESTIMATION, BAD-DATA REMOVAL &
ADVERSARIAL ACTION
The power grid represents a set V of n buses (nodes)
connected by a set E of |E| transmission lines (directed
edges). As an example, the IEEE 14 bus test system [20] is
given in Figure 1.
Measurement Model: We use the DC power flow model
[22] for the grid in this paper. Here, voltage magnitudes
are assumed to be constant at unity on all buses and the
state vector of the system comprises of all bus phase angles
x ∈ Rn. Transmission lines are assumed to be perfectly
inductive (zero resistance) with a diagonal susceptance matrix
B. We use xi to denote the phase angle at bus i and Bij to
denote the susceptance of line (i, j). We consider a m length
measurement vector z ∈ Rm that comprises of a) active power
flows on lines and b) voltage phase angles on buses, collected
from conventional meters and phasor measurement units in the
grid. The relation between z and x is given by
z = Hx+ e (1)
where H is the m × n full-ranked measurement matrix and
e is a zero mean Gaussian measurement noise vector with
known covariance Σ. If the kth1 and k
th
2 entries (rows) in z
(H) measures the power flow on line (i, j) and the phase angle
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Fig. 2. State Estimator for a power system [21], [22]
at node i respectively, then the DC power flow gives
z(k1) = Bij(x(i)− x(j)), z(k2) = x(i)
H(k1, :) = [0..0 Bij 0..0 −Bij 0..0] (2)
H(k2, :) = [0..0 1 0..0 0 0..0] (3)
Without a loss of generality, we introduce a n+ 1th ‘refer-
ence’ bus with phase angle 0 in the system and accordingly
append 0 to the state vector x. Note that the phase angle
measurement at any bus i is equivalent to a flow on a
hypothetical line of unit conductance between bus i and the
‘reference’ bus. To represent this, we augment an additional
column hg to matrix H with value −1 for rows representing
phase angles and 0 otherwise. We thus convert every entry in
z into a flow measurement given by
z = Hx = [H|hg]
[
x
0
]
Note that the augmented measurement matrix has the structure
of a susceptance weighted graph incidence matrix of rank n.
From this point, we use x and H to denote the augmented
state vector and measurement matrices respectively.
State Estimation: The complete DC state estimator used in
this paper is given in Figure 2 [21], [22].
The true state estimate x∗ is generated from measurement
vector z by a weighted least-square minimizer that mini-
mizes the weighted residual’s magnitude given by J(x, z) =
‖Σ−.5(z − Hx)‖2 over variable x. As shown in Fig. 2, this
step is followed by a threshold (λ) based bad-data detector that
determines the presence of bad-data by the following test:
‖Σ−.5(z −Hx∗)‖2 ≤ λ accept x∗
> λ detect bad-data (4)
If bad-data is detected, the bad-data remover is called to
identify and remove bad-data as described below.
Bad-data Removal: Using basic linear algebra
[21], [22], it can be shown that the residual vector
r = z − Hx∗ = [I − H(HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1]z. Based
on the assumption that probability of bad-data affecting
greater number of locations is low, the estimator removes
the minimum number of measurements such that the
remaining measurements satisfy the bad-data check in
Eq. (4). The optimal identification and removal scheme
for multiple incorrect measurements is NP-hard [21], [13]
and hence iterative or greedy schemes are used in practice.
Unless otherwise stated, we assume that the unmanipulated
measurement vector z is clean and leads to estimation of the
correct state vector x∗.
Adversarial Tools and Attack Types: Following past work
in literature, we consider the adversary’s goal to produce a
non-zero change in the estimated state vector x∗ using an
minimum cost attack. In reality, the adversary motivation may
be economic (Eg. creating sub-optimal prices [23]) or grid
instability (Eg. producing/hiding grid failures) or be restricted
to specific buses (Eg. targeted attacked [10]). Keeping the
adversarial goal as changing the state estimate analyzes the
grid security in the strongest terms, where the grid controller
is agnostic and gives equal weight to all adversaries.
We denote the secure set of measurements in z that are
encrypted against adversarial data injection by S. However,
measurements in S can suffer from bad-data arising from
measurement noise. The remaining insecure measurements are
denoted by set Sc. As stated in the Introduction, we consider
three adversarial tools here. Among them, data injection is
denoted by an additive vector a that modifies the measurement
vector z to z + a. As secure measurements are immune to
data injection, a(i) = 0 ∀i ∈ S. In contrast, jamming can be
conducted on both secure and insecure measurements and is
represented by removal of the jammed measurements from z.
Let pI , pS
c
J and p
S
J denote the costs of data injection, jamming
insecure measurements, and jamming secure measurements
respectively. Further, a permissible set of costs are assumed
to follow:
Assumption 1: pS
c
J ≤ pSJ ≤ pI
Note that data injection involves changing meter measurements
by precisely formatted real values and following communica-
tion protocols to ensure their usage at the state estimator. In
constrast, jamming can be involved by physical [16] or cyber
destruction [15] of the meter reading. Further, an adversary
equipped with data injection can conduct jamming by inserting
garbage values into the measurements. Thus, we assume that
injection cost pI is not less that jamming costs. Secondly,
jamming a secure measurement can be considered at least
as costly as jamming an insecure measurement as secure
measurements are encrypted and may require bypassing the
resident security features leading to pS
c
J ≤ pSJ . We assume
the adversary to know/estimate these costs from the respective
instrumentation and skills necessary for deployment. We show
later that the attack construction depends on the relative values
of these adversarial costs rather than their exact values.
A feasible attack refers to a successful attack; a feasible
attack with minimum attack cost is called an optimal attack.
We use injection attacks to refer to attacks that use data
injection alone. For attacks that additionally use jamming of
insecure measurements, we use the phrase jamming attacks.
Attacks proposed in this work that use all three adversarial
tools are termed generalized attacks. Finally, we prefix the
attack denotation by its ‘type’. The two types of attacks
discussed in this paper are defined below.
Definition 1.
‘Hidden’ attack [6]: This well-studied attack is not detected
by the bad-data detector. The adversary ensures feasibility by
manipulating measurements in a way such that the measure-
ment residue remains unchanged.
‘Detectable’ attack [12], [13]: This attack initially fails
the bad-data detection test but passes it after the estima-
tor removes bad-data. The adversary ensures feasibility by
manipulating measurements such that the minimum set of
measurements that are removed to pass the detection test does
not include all manipulated measurements.
In the next section, we describe traditional attack frame-
works (injection attacks and jamming attacks) that operate
through insecure measurements only. This background will
help analyze generalized data attacks in subsequent sections.
III. DATA ATTACKS USING INSECURE MEASUREMENTS
We analyze both ‘hidden’ and ‘detectable’ traditional (in-
jection and jamming) attacks where the adversary is limited
to attacking insecure measurements in set Sc. First, we focus
on injection attacks.
A. Injection Attacks
Here, the adversary’s strategy is entirely represented by the
injection vector a that is added to the measurement vector
z. As data injection is the only tool available, its cost pI
does not influence the attack construction. Consider the case
of a ‘hidden’ injection attack. As mentioned in Definition 1,
the attack is successful if it doesn’t change the measurement
residual. If a = Hc 6= 0 for some c ∈ Rn+1, this holds as
‖Σ−.5(z−Hx∗)‖2 = ‖Σ−.5(z+a−H(x∗+c))‖2 and the state
estimate is modified to x∗+ c. The optimal ‘hidden’ injection
attack is given by the sparest a in the following [9], [10]:
min
c∈Rn+1−{0}
‖a‖0 (H-I)
s.t. a = Hc, c(n+ 1) = 0, a(i) = 0 ∀i ∈ S (S: Secure Set)
Next, we look at a ‘detectable’ injection attack. By Definition 1
and the state estimator’s bad-data removal technique described
after Eq. 4, it is clear that an injection vector a 6= 0 will
successfully change the state estimate only if removal of some
k < ‖a‖0 entries from the measurement vector is sufficient to
pass the bad-data detection test, while preserving observability.
We describe the construction of such an injection vector a
now. For any Hc 6= 0, include more than half of the non-zero
entries in Hc in a and replace the rest by 0. Observe that
‖a‖0 > ‖Hc − a‖0 here. Thus, measurements corresponding
to the non-zero terms in (Hc − a) are incorrectly identified
as bad-data instead of the injected measurements in a. After
removal of bad-data from measurement vector and elimination
of corresponding rows from the measurement matrix H , a now
lies in the column space of the modified measurement matrix
and a feasible attack is conducted. The optimal measurements
from Hc to include in the attack vector a are given by the
unity terms in the optimal binary vector d of the following
[13], [19]:
min
d∈{0,1}m,c∈Rn+1−{0}
‖d‖0 (D-I)
s.t. c(n+ 1) = 0, d(i) = 0 ∀i ∈ S
‖d‖0 > ‖Hc‖0/2 (for feasibility) (5)
rank(DH) = n, diag(D) = 1− (1− d) ∗ (Hc)spty
(6)
Here, a ∗ b refers to the element-wise multiplication between
vector a and b, while aspty denotes the sparsity pattern in
vector a. In the rank constraint (6), D is a 0 − 1 diagonal
matrix with value of 0 for removed measurements. We now
describe graph-theoretic solutions for attack construction for
both attack types.
Graph-Theoretic Solution: We construct undirected graph
GH with n+1 nodes and edges corresponding to measurement
rows in H . We denote secure and insecure edges in GH
corresponding to secure and insecure measurements in H
respectively. Due to the unimodular structure of H , it can
be shown that the optimal solutions of Problems H-I or D-
I remain unchanged if c is restricted to be a 0 − 1 binary
vector and H is replaced by the unweighted incidence matrix
AH of GH . In this case, the non-zero terms in AHc in fact
correspond to a graph-cut in GH [9], [13]. Thus, the optimal
attack design can be stated as a graph cut problem as described
below:
Theorem 1.
[9, Theorem 2] The optimal ‘hidden’ injection attack in
Problem H-I is given by the minimum cardinality cut C∗ in
GH with no secure edges.
[13, Theorem 2] The optimal ‘detectable’ injection attack in
Problem D-I is given by any b1 + |C∗|/2c insecure edges in
C∗, where C∗ denotes the minimum cardinality cut in GH
with a minority of secure edges (|C∗ ∩ S| < |C∗|/2).
It follows immediately that the cost of the optimal ‘de-
tectable’ injection attack is never greater than .5 + 1/|C∗|
times the cost of the optimal ‘hidden’ injection attack C∗.
Next, we add jamming of insecure measurements to the attack
framework and discuss its implications.
B. Jamming Attacks
Here the adversary can jam and remove insecure measure-
ments at a cost pS
c
J in addition to injecting data at cost pI .
Note that for a non-zero change in state estimate, adversary
should inject data into at least one insecure measurement. The
design of the optimal ‘hidden’ jamming attack is given by:
Theorem 2. The optimal ‘hidden’ jamming attack for all
permissible pI and pS
c
J is constructed by injecting data into
one edge and jamming the remaining edges in the minimum
cardinality cut in GH with no secure edges.
Brief Proof steps: Using Theorem 1 and pS
c
J ≤ pI , it
is clear that the least cost ‘hidden’ jamming attack designed
using the optimal ‘hidden’ injection attack is given by Theo-
rem 2. Its global optimality can be proved by contradiction.
Now we look at ‘detectable’ jamming attacks as discussed
in [19]. Consider a cut C in graph GH with nSC and n
Sc
C
secure and insecure edges respectively, with nS
c
C > n
S
C . Using
Theorem 1, C is feasible for a ‘detectable’ injection attack. If
the adversary jams kCJ < n
SC
C − nSC insecure measurements
in C, the remaining |C| − kCJ measurements still constitute a
feasible cut with a majority of insecure edges. The adversary
can thus inject data into b1 + |C|−kCJ2 c insecure edges in C
to conduct a successful ‘detectable’ jamming attack of attack
cost pC given by
pC = pS
c
J k
C
J + pIb1 +
|C| − kCJ
2
c
= (pS
c
J − pI/2)kCJ + pI
|C|+ 2− (|C| − kCJ ) mod 2
2
(7)
Note that if pS
c
J < pI/2 the attack cost p
C of cut C decreases
with increasing kCJ and is lowest at k
C
J = n
Sc
C − nSC − 1.
Similarly, it can be shown that for pS
c
J ≥ pI/2, the attack cost
is minimum at kCJ = 1 − |C| mod 2. Using these values of
kCJ in the Eq. (7) for attack cost leads to the following result
on optimal attack design.
Theorem 3. [19, Theorem 2] The construction of the optimal
‘detectable’ jamming attack with jamming cost pS
c
J and data
injection cost pI for insecure measurements is given by:
1. pS
c
J < pI/2: Give weights of pI − pS
c
J and p
Sc
J to secure
and insecure edges respectively in GH and find the minimum
weight cut C∗ with nSC∗ < |C∗|/2 secure edges. Use 1 +
nSC∗ insecure edges for bad-data injection and jam the other
insecure edges.
2. pS
c
J ≥ pI/2: Find the minimum cardinality cut C∗ with a
minority of secure edges in GH . Use b 1+|C
∗|
2 c insecure edges
for data injection and jam (1− |C∗| mod 2) insecure edges.
A detailed derivation of Theorem 3 is given in [19]. The
main argument is also elucidated through the example in
Fig. 3. To conclude, the range of permissible relative costs
for jamming insecure measurements is thus separable into
two intervals with distinct designs for optimal ‘detectable’
jamming attack.
In the next section, we present our generalized attack
framework that allows jamming (not data injection) of secure
measurements by the adversary.
IV. DATA ATTACKS WITH JAMMING SECURE
MEASUREMENTS
The adversary in this case has three tools (jamming se-
cure measurement, jamming insecure measurement, and data
injection in insecure measurement) with distinct costs per
measurement (pSJ , p
Sc
J , and pI ). From Assumption 1, we have
pS
c
J ≤ pSJ ≤ pI . The introduction of jamming of secure
measurements creates major changes in the adversarial strategy
as it relaxes the feasibility requirements for both ‘hidden’ and
‘detectable’ attacks as noted below.
𝒑
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Fig. 3. Effect of jamming cost pS
c
J and data injection cost pI on
the minimum ‘detectable’ jamming attack C∗ derived from a cut C with
nSC(< |C|/2) secure and nS
c
C insecure edges. Secure edges in the cut are
colored red while untouched, jammed and injected insecure edges are colored
white, blue and green colors respectively. When pS
c
J < pI/2, attack cost can
be reduced by replacing one data injection with jamming two measurements
as shown in the cuts on the left of C. For pS
c
J ≥ pI/2, attack cost is
reduced by replacing two jammed measurements by one measurement with
data injection while leaving the other untouched as shown on the right side of
cut C. Optimal attacks C∗ got from this replacement are given by Theorem 3.
A. ‘Hidden’ Generalized Attacks
Theorem 1 and 2 states that feasible cuts for ‘hidden’
injection and jamming attacks cannot include any secure edge.
With the ability to jam secure measurements, this is no longer
necessary. Consider a cut C with nSC secure and n
Sc
C > 0
insecure edges. If all nSC secure edges are removed by jam-
ming, the remaining cut can provide a ‘hidden’ attack where
one insecure edge is used for data injection and the rest are
jammed. The total attack cost is pSJn
S
C +p
Sc
J n
Sc
C +(pI −pS
c
J ).
The optimal attack is thus given by:
Theorem 4. Give weights of pSJ and pS
c
J to secure and
insecure edges respectively in GH and find the minimum
weight cut C∗ with non-zero number of insecure edges. The
optimal ‘hidden’ generalized attack is constructed by using
one insecure edge in C∗ for data injection and jamming the
remaining cut-edges.
Note that the optimal attack design here has the same form
for all relative values of jamming and injections costs. Next,
we look at ‘detectable’ generalized attacks.
B. ‘Detectable’ Generalized Attacks
We study how the design of a ‘detectable’ attack changes
when jamming of secure measurements is allowed. To do so,
we consider a cut C in graph GH with nSC secure and n
Sc
C
insecure edges. We can have two cases for C: A) nSC < n
Sc
C
and B) nSC ≥ nS
c
C . Theorem 1 and 3 state that to conduct
a successful ‘detectable’ injection or jamming attack, the
adversary requires graph-cuts with a majority of insecure
edges (Case A). Thus, we have
Lemma 1. A ‘detectable’ generalized attack can be con-
structed from cut C having nSC secure and n
Sc
C insecure
edges if nS
c
C > 0 and the adversary initially jams k
S
C ≥
[nSC − nS
c
C + 1]
+ secure cut-edges, where [a]+ = max{0, a}.
This step ensures that after removal of kSC jammed secure
measurements, the remaining cut has a majority of insecure
edges as shown in Fig. 4. Further, jamming of secure edges
can lead to a reducing in attack cost as well. For example,
if pS
c
J + p
S
J ≤ pI , a feasible cut C’s data injected insecure
edge can be replaced with jamming of two edges in C, one
secure and another insecure to lower the attack cost. This is
demonstrated by the cut on the right side in Fig. 4.
Cost reduction Infeasible Cut 
Jam secure
  
Insecure, 
Jammed   Data injected  
Insecure,  
untouched 
Secure,  
untouched 
Secure 
Insecure 
Feasible Cut 
Insecure, 
Jammed  
 
Fig. 4. Effect of jamming secure measurements on design of ‘detectable’
generalized attacks. The cut on the left is infeasible due to a minority of
insecure edges. Jamming secure measurements leads to a feasible cut in the
middle. Finally for pS
c
J + p
S
J ≤ pI , attack cost can be reduced by replacing
one data injected edge with two jammed edges (one secure and one insecure).
To analyze the effect of jamming cost for secure edges,
we follow the approach in Theorem 3. We aim to determine
the optimal ‘detectable’ generalized attack strategy over
different range of costs for pI , pSJ and p
Sc
J . We begin with
the following cost interval.
Cost Interval I:[pScJ ≥ pI/2]
⋂
[pSJ ≥ pI/2]
Using Theorem 3 for pScJ ≥ pI/2, the minimum cost attack
using the remaining |C|−kSC edges is constructed by injecting
data into b 1+|C|−kSC2 c and jamming (1− (|C| − kSC) mod 2)
insecure edges. The total cost is given by:
pC = pSJk
S
C + pIb
1 + |C| − kSC
2
c+ pScJ (1− (|C| − kSC) mod 2)
(8)
As pSJ ≥ pI/2, we note that pC is increasing with kSC . Using
Lemma 1, the minimum cost is achieved at kSC = [n
S
C−nS
c
C +
1]+. For Case A (nSC < n
Sc
C ), this gives k
S
C = 0 (no jamming
of secure measurement), and the optimal attack is identical in
structure to the optimal ‘detectable’ jamming attack for [pScJ ≥
pI/2] in Theorem 3. For Case B (nSC ≥ nS
c
C ), the optimal k
S
C
equals nSC − nS
c
C + 1. The attack cost thus reduces to
pC = pSJ (n
S
C − nS
c
C + 1) + pIn
Sc
C (using Eq. (8))
= pSJn
S
C + (pI − pSJ )nS
c
C + p
S
J (9)
Excluding the constant term, this optimal attack cost for C in
Case B is equal to its cut-weight if secure and insecure edges
are given weights pSJ and pI − pSJ respectively.
As GH has cuts in both Case A and Case B, the optimal
‘generalized’ attack selects the minimum cost one among the
optimal attacks for Cases A and B. This is summarized below:
Theorem 5. The optimal ‘detectable’ generalized attack in
GH for the cost interval [pScJ ≥ pI/2]
⋂
[pSJ ≥ pI/2] is given
by the minimum cost attack among the optimal solutions of
the following two graph optimization problems:
Problem I-A. Find the minimum cardinality feasible cut C∗
in GH with a minority of secure edges. Use b(1 + |C∗|)/2c
insecure edges for bad-data injection and jam (1 − |C∗|
mod 2) insecure edges.
Problem I-B. Give weights of pSJ and pI − pSJ to secure
and insecure edges respectively in GH and find the minimum
weight cut C∗ with (nSC∗ ≥ |C∗|/2) secure edges and
(nS
c
C∗ > 0) insecure edges. Inject data into all insecure edges
and jam (nSC∗ + 1− nS
c
C∗) secure edges.
Next we analyze cut C with nSC secure and n
Sc
C > 0
insecure edges in the second cost interval.
Cost Interval II: [pScJ < pI/2]
⋂
[pSJ + p
Sc
J ≥ pI ]
By Lemma 1, the adversary initially jams kSC ≥
[nSC − nS
c
C + 1]
+ secure cut-edges leaving (nSC − kSC)
secure and nS
c
C∗ insecure edges. As p
Sc
J < pI/2, the minimum
cost attack constructed from the remaining edges includes
data injection into nSC − kSC + 1 measurements and jamming
the rest of the insecure measurements (see Theorem 3). This
gives an attack cost of:
pC = pSJk
S
C + pI(n
S
C − kSC + 1) + pS
c
J (n
Sc
C − nSC + kSC − 1)
= (pSJ + p
Sc
J − pI)kSC + (pI − pS
c
J )(n
S
C + 1) + p
Sc
J n
Sc
C
(10)
As pSJ + p
Sc
J ≥ pI , the attack cost in Eq. (10) increases with
kSC . The minimum attack cost is thus attained for Case A
(nSC < n
Sc
C ) at k
S
C = 0, and for Case B (n
S
C ≥ nS
c
C ) at
kSC = n
S
C −nS
c
C + 1. The corresponding attack costs are given
by:
pC = (pI − pScJ )(nSC + 1) + pS
c
J n
Sc
C (for Case A) (11)
pC = pSJ (n
S
C + 1) + (pI − pSJ )nS
c
C (for Case B) (12)
Observe that in either case, ignoring additive constants, the
optimal attack cost is given by the cut-weight of C with
distinct weights for secure and insecure measurements. We
can thus determine the optimal ‘detectable’ generalized attack
in this interval as follows:
Theorem 6. The optimal ‘detectable’ generalized attack in
GH for the cost interval [pScJ < pI/2]
⋂
[pSJ + p
Sc
J ≥ pI ] is
given by the minimum cost attack among the optimal solutions
of the following two graph optimization problems:
Problem II-A. Give weights of pI − pScJ and pS
c
J to secure
and insecure edges respectively in GH and find the minimum
weight cut C∗ with (nSC∗ < |C∗|/2) secure edges. Inject data
into (nSC∗ + 1) insecure edges and jam the other insecure
edges.
Problem II-B. Give weights of pSJ and pI − pSJ to secure
and insecure edges respectively in GH and find the minimum
weight cut C∗ with (nSC∗ ≥ |C∗|/2) secure edges and
(nS
c
C∗ > 0) insecure edges. Inject data into all insecure edges
and jam (nSC∗ + 1− nS
c
C∗) secure edges.
Finally, we look at cost interval III with low jamming costs.
Cost Interval III:[pScJ < pI/2]
⋂
[pSJ + p
Sc
J < pI ]
As pScJ < pI/2 constraint is common to Interval II, the
preliminary analysis here is identical to the discussion
preceding Eq. (10) and leads to the following attack cost:
pC = (pSJ + p
Sc
J − pI)kSC + (pI − pS
c
J )(n
S
C + 1) + p
Sc
J n
Sc
C
(13)
where kSC ≥ [nSC − nS
c
C + 1]
+ is the number of jammed
secured measurements. Observe that the attack cost decreases
on increasing kSC in this Interval. The minimum attack cost is
thus obtained when kSC = max k
S
C = n
S
C for both Cases A
and B. The optimal attack cost for cut C is given by:
pC = pSJn
S
C + p
Sc
J n
Sc
C + (pI − pS
c
J ) (for Cases A, B) (14)
which is an additive constant away from C’ cut-weight if
secure and insecure edges are given weights pSJ and p
Sc
J re-
spectively. The optimal ‘detectable’ generalized attack design
is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 7. The optimal ‘detectable’ generalized attack in
GH for the cost interval [pScJ < pI/2]
⋂
[pSJ + p
Sc
J < pI ]
is given by the optimal solution of the following graph
optimization problem:
Problem III. Give weights of pSJ and p
Sc
J to secure and insecure
edges respectively in GH and find the minimum weight cut C∗
with non-zero insecure edges. Inject data into one insecure
edge and jam all other secure and insecure edges.
To summarize, the design of the optimal ‘detectable’ gen-
eralized attack can be divided into three intervals that cover
the entire range of permissible jamming and data injection
costs as shown in Fig. 5. In Internals I (Theorem 5) and II
(Theorem 6), the optimal attack is given by the minimum
of two constrained graph-cut problems, while in Interval III
(Theorem 7), it is given by the solution of a single problem.
The following points are worth noting.
1) Problems I-A and II-A pertaining to Case A in Intervals
I and II are identical to the sub-problems for designing
optimal ‘detectable’ jamming attacks in Theorem 3.
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Fig. 5. Separation of the range of relative costs for jamming secure (pSJ ) and
insecure (pScJ ) measurements into intervals with distinct formulations for opti-
mal ‘detectable’ generalized attack. Interval I denotes [pScJ ≥ pI/2]
⋂
[pSJ ≥
pI/2], Interval II denotes [p
Sc
J < pI/2]
⋂
[pSJ + p
Sc
J ≥ pI ] and Interval III
denotes [pScJ < pI/2]
⋂
[pSJ + p
Sc
J < pI ]. The fourth interval p
S
J < p
Sc
J is
not permissible by Assumption 1.
2) Problems I-B and II-B pertaining to Case B in Intervals
I and II are identical.
3) Problem III in Interval III is identical to the problem
of designing optimal ‘hidden’ generalized attacks in
Theorem 4.
The first two observations arise from the constraint pSJ +p
Sc
J ≥
pI in Intervals I and II. This constraint restricts the optimal
number of jammed secured measurements at the minimum
necessary for feasible attack construction, which is 0 for cuts
with majority of insecure edges. Thus Problems I-A and II-
A are similar to the ones in Theorem 3. For Interval III, the
constraint pSJ + p
Sc
J < pI implies that the attack cost can
be reduced by replacing data injection at one measurement
with jamming of a pair of insecure and secure measurements
or jamming two insecure measurements. Thus, the optimal
‘detectable’ generalized attack in Interval III includes only one
measurement with data injection and is identical to the optimal
‘hidden’ generalized attack in Theorem 4.
For all permissible costs as per Assumption 1, the reduction
in attack cost as a result of jamming is shown through sim-
ulations in Section VI. In addition, the next theorem presents
the threat to grid resilience posed by generalized attacks.
Theorem 8.
1. A system is vulnerable to generalized data attacks (both
‘hidden’ and ‘detectable’) even if it contains only one insecure
measurement.
2. Addition of new secure measurements alone does not prevent
generalized attacks.
Proof: Consider the graph GH . As mentioned in Theo-
rems 4, 5, 6 and 7, a feasible generalized attack requires a cut
in GH with non-zero number of insecure edges. Such a cut
does not exist only if all measurements are secure. Hence the
first statement holds. Addition of new secure measurements
can increase the attack cost of a cut but does not change its
feasibility. Hence the second statement holds.
It follows from Theorem 8 that the prevention of general-
ized attacks needs all existing insecure measurements to be
replaced with secure ones, rather than addition of new secure
measurements. This is a much stricter requirement than that
for traditional ‘hidden’ and ‘detectable’ attacks which can be
prevented by adding n and O(m/2) new secure measurements
respectively [10], [13]. Here, n is the number of buses (ex-
cluding ‘reference’ bus) and m is number of measurements in
the grid. Thus, our generalized attack framework undermines
grid resilience to data attacks and cyber adversaries beyond
previously studied attack models. In the next section, we
comment on the hardness of designing generalized data attacks
and develop approximate iterative algorithms to solve them.
V. ALGORITHM FOR GENERALIZED ATTACK
CONSTRUCTION
Consider the graph GH with sets S and Sc of secure and
insecure edges respectively. The adversary is assumed to know
the costs associated with jamming an insecure measurement,
jamming a secure measurement and injecting data into an
insecure measurement, given by pS
c
J , p
S
J and pI respectively.
We first discuss algorithm for designing ‘hidden’ generalized
attacks.
‘Hidden’ generalized attacks: By Theorem 4, the optimal
attack of this type is given by the minimum weight cut C∗ with
non-zero insecure edges in GH , where secure and insecure
edges have weight pSJ and p
Sc
J respectively. Algorithm 1
outputs the optimal attack.
Algorithm 1 Optimal ‘Hidden’ Generalized Attack Design
Input: Graph GH , Set S (Sc) of secure (insecure) edges with
edge-weights pSJ (p
Sc
J )
1: i← 1, w ←∞
2: while i ≤ |Sc| do
3: Pick ith edge (s, t) in Sc.
4: C ← minimum weight ‘s− t’ cut separating s and t in
GH
5: if w > C’s weight then
6: w ← C’s weight, Cf ← C
7: end if
8: i← i+ 1
9: end while
10: Use Cf for optimal attack in Theorem 4.
Working and Complexity: In each iteration of the While
Loop (Step 2), Algorithm 1 picks an insecure edge in Sc and
finds the minimum weight cut C that contains it. The feasible
cut Cf is updated if the current cut C has lower weight.
At the end of the iteration, the optimal attack is constructed
by injecting data into one insecure edge and jamming the
rest of the edges in Cf . Since, minimum ‘s − t’ cut can
be computed using max-flow algorithm in O(nm log(n2/m))
time [27], Algorithm 1 has polynomial time complexity of
O(|Sc|nm log(n2/m)). Here n and m are number of nodes
and edges in graph GH .
‘Detectable’ generalized attacks: As analyzed in the pre-
vious section, the relative values of costs of jamming and
data-injection change the design of ‘detectable’ generalized
attacks. Attack construction in Interval III is identical to that
of ‘hidden’ generalized attacks and is solved in polynomial
time by Algorithm 1. Here, we discuss the construction of
attacks in Intervals I ([pScJ ≥ pI/2]
⋂
[pSJ ≥ pI/2]) and II
([pScJ < pI/2]
⋂
[pSJ + p
Sc
J ≥ pI ]). Theorems 5 and 6 state
that in either interval, the optimal ‘detectable’ generalized
attack is determined by solving two constrained graph-cut
problems on GH . In each of these problems (I-A, I-B, II-
A and II-B), the constraint involves finding a cut C in GH
of Case A(nSC < |C|/2) or Case B(nSC ≥ |C|/2) where nSC
is the number of secure edges in the cut. Reference [13]
states that finding a cut where edges of one kind are in
majority is equivalent to the NP-hard ‘ratio-cut’ problem [24].
Thus, determining the optimal ‘detectable’ generalized attack
in Intervals I and II is NP-hard in general.
Now, we provide an approximate algorithm (Algorithm
2) for solving constrained graph-cut problems of the form
included in Theorems 5 and 6. Algorithm 2 is a generalization
of an iterative min-cut based algorithm in [19], with additional
constraints. The exact weights for secure and insecure edges
and constraint (Case A or B) are specified by the particular
problem being solved.
Working and Complexity: We describe Algorithm 2 with
graph-cut constraint specified by Case A (nSC < |C|/2). The
analysis for Case B follow in a similar way. The edge-weights
of secure and insecure edges are specified by Problem I-A or
II-A. Step 1 computes the minimum weight cut C in GH and
checks if it satisfies the cut constraint in Case A (Step 4).
If the constraint is not satisfied, one secure edge is selected
randomly in C and its edge-weight is increased by β (Step 5).
Here β’s value is taken as either ∞ or the secure edge-weight
for Case A (insecure edge-weight for Case B). Following this,
the minimum weight cut is recomputed and checked to see if
the cut constraint is satisfied. This process is iterated until
a feasible cut is obtained or the cut-weight grows beyond
threshold γ, at which point the algorithm declares no solution.
We discuss the complexity for β = ∞ and Case A.
Here, the algorithm computes a maximum of |S| min-cut
computations, one for each secure edge. Since each min-
cut can be computed in O(|n||m| + |n|2 log |n|) time [28],
Algorithm 2 has a worst-case computational complexity of
O(|S||n||m|+ |S||n|2 log |n|) for constraint specified by Case
A.
It needs to be noted that the finding the existence of a
feasible cut of Case A or B is NP-hard [13] and hence
obtaining the optimal cut is NP-hard as well. Thus, Algorithm
2 for optimal attack construction is approximate and may not
return a solution for all system configurations. Determining the
approximation gap of Algorithm 2 will depend on approxima-
Algorithm 2 ‘Minimum Weight Constrained Graph-Cut Con-
struction
Input: Graph GH , Set S and Sc of secure and insecure
edges respectively, edge weights and Case (A or B) given by
problem (I-A, I-B, II-A or II-B), β, γ
1: Compute min-weight cut C in GH
2: wC ← C’s weight
3: if Case A then
4: while (wC < γ)&&(2|C
⋂
S| ≥ |C|) do
5: Pick i ∈ C⋂S, increase weight by β
6: Compute min-weight cut C in GH
7: wC ← C’s weight
8: end while
9: if 2|C⋂S| < |C| then
10: Construct attack for Problem using C
11: else
12: Declare no solution
13: end if
14: else
15: while (wC < γ)&&(|C
⋂
Sc| = 0 or 2|C⋂Sc| >
|C|) do
16: if |C⋂Sc| = 0 then
17: Pick i ∈ C⋂S, increase weight by ∞
18: else
19: Pick i ∈ C⋂Sc, increase weight by β
20: end if
21: Compute min-weight cut C in GH
22: wC ← C’s weight
23: end while
24: if 2|C⋂Sc| ≤ |C| then
25: Construct attack for Problem using C
26: else
27: Declare no solution
28: end if
29: end if
tions of the ratio-cut problem for feasibility and additionally
on reducing the cut-size for optimality. In the next section,
we present simulation results to justify the good performance
of Algorithm 2 in designing optimal ‘detectable’ generalized
attacks.
VI. RESULTS ON IEEE TEST SYSTEMS
We discuss the performance of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm
2 in designing ‘hidden’ and ‘detectable’ generalized attacks by
simulations on IEEE 14-bus and 57-bus test systems [20]. In
each simulation run, we put flow measurements on all lines and
phase angle measurements on 60% (randomly selected) of the
system buses. We vary the fraction of secure measurements
in either system, and observe its effect on average cost of
constructing data attacks as specified by Theorems 4, 5, 6
and 7. We first consider Algorithm 1 that gives the optimal
‘hidden’ generalized attack as well as ‘detectable’ generalized
attack in Interval III. Here, the costs of jamming insecure
and secure measurements are taken respectively as .25 and
.5 relative to the cost of injecting data into an insecure
measurement, respecting the inequality in Assumption 1. Fig. 6
presents the trends in average costs of ‘hidden’ injection,
‘detectable’ injection and ‘hidden’ generalized attacks for the
IEEE 14-bus and 57-bus test systems for configurations where
‘hidden’ injection attacks are feasible. It is clearly observed
that adding jamming to the adversarial tools reduces the cost
of ‘hidden’ attacks greatly. In fact ‘hidden’ generalized attacks
are less expensive than ‘detectable’ injection attacks which on
average cost less than 50% of the cost of ‘hidden’ injection
attacks [13].
Next we consider Algorithm 2 and use it to generate ‘de-
tectable’ generalized attacks in Intervals I and II (see Fig. 5).
For Intervals I and II specified in Fig. 5, the relative costs of
jamming an insecure measurement are respectively taken as
.6 and .25 times the cost of data injection. The relative cost
of jamming a secure measurement to that of data injection
into an insecure measurement is taken as .8 in both intervals,
as per Assumption 1. To show the adversarial advantage
of jamming secure measurements, we compare the average
costs of ‘detectable’ generalized (DG) attacks with that of
‘detectable’ jamming (DJ) attacks in each case. Fig. 7 presents
the average DG and DJ attack costs for the IEEE 14-bus and
57-bus test systems in cases with feasible ‘hidden’ injection
attacks. It can be observed that though jamming of secure
measurements reduces the average attack costs, its effect is
more pronounced in Interval I where cost of jamming an
insecure measurement is higher. Similarly, Fig. 7 demonstrates
the trends in average DG and DJ attack costs for the same
systems, but by considering cases with feasible ‘detectable’
injections attacks. Even in this case, the cost improvement in
DG over DJ attacks is greater in Interval I.
Note that the rise in attack cost with increase in the fraction
of secure measurements in the system is greater in Fig. 8
than in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. This disparity is due to the fact
that in Figs. 6 and 7, we only record attack costs for system
configurations with feasible ‘hidden’ injection attacks. As the
number of such configurations decreases rapidly with increas-
ing number of secure measurements, we end up averaging over
fewer configurations leading to lower recorded average attack
costs. The number of feasible configurations for ‘detectable’
injection attacks does not decrease as rapidly, hence Fig. 8 has
cost curves with steeper slopes in general.
VII. CONCLUSION
We introduce ‘generalized’ data attacks on state estimation
in this paper. In our attack framework, an adversary uses
three tools with distinct costs: jamming of encrypted (se-
cure) measurements, data injection and jamming of insecure
measurements to optimize the cost and expand the scope of
traditional data attacks in literature. We consider both ‘hidden’
and ‘detectable’ data attacks and present novel graph-cut based
formulations for construction of optimal generalized attacks
of each type. We show that the optimal ‘hidden’ attack with
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Algorithm 1 on the IEEE 14 and 57 bus test systems with flow measurements
on all lines, phasor measurements on 60% of the buses and protection on a
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is taken as 1. The costs of jamming an insecure measurement (pS
c
J ) and a
secure measurement (pSJ ) are taken as .25 and .5 respectively.
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Fig. 7. Average cost of ‘detectable’ generalized (DG) and ‘detectable’
jamming (DJ) attacks (when ‘hidden’ injection attack exists) in Cost Intervals I
and II, produced by Algorithm 2 (with finite β) on the IEEE 14 and 57 bus test
systems with flow measurements on all lines, phasor measurements on 60%
of the buses and protection on a fraction of measurements selected randomly.
In Interval I and II, the costs of jamming an insecure measurement are taken
as .6 and .25 respectively. The costs of jamming a secure measurement and
data injection are taken as .8 and 1 respectively in both intervals.
adversarial jamming is given by the minimum weight graph-
cut where the edge-weights for secure and insecure measure-
ments are based on the costs of jamming and data injection
in the system. We prove that the optimal ‘hidden’ attack with
jamming is exactly constructed using a polynomial time min-
cut based algorithm. For ‘detectable’ attacks, we show that the
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Fig. 8. Average cost of ‘detectable’ generalized (DG) and ‘detectable’ jam-
ming (DJ) attacks (when ‘detectable’ jamming attack exists) in Cost Intervals I
and II produced by Algorithm 2 (with finite β) on the IEEE 14 and 57 bus test
systems with flow measurements on all lines, phasor measurements on 60%
of the buses and protection on a fraction of measurements selected randomly.
In Interval I and II, the costs of jamming an insecure measurement are taken
as .6 and .25 respectively. The costs of jamming a secure measurement and
data injection are taken as .8 and 1 respectively in both intervals.
entire range of relative costs for data injection and jamming of
secure and insecure measurements can be divided into three
separate intervals, each with distinct ‘constrained graph-cut’
based optimal attack construction. We present approximate al-
gorithms that use iterative min-cut computations to determine
the optimal ‘detectable’ attack in each interval. Due to the abil-
ity to jam secure measurements, our generalized framework
has very relaxed constraints on attack feasibility compared
to traditional models. This reduces the cost of ‘hidden’ and
‘detectable’ attacks as well as increases adversarial immunity
against grid security. Specifically, we show that our general-
ized data attacks are even feasible for systems with a single
insecure measurement and hence are not prevented by adding
new secure measurements. We present simulation results of
our proposed attack framework on IEEE test cases for different
costs of adversarial tools and discuss the performance of our
algorithms. Jamming of secure measurements indeed severely
weakens grid security by reducing attack cost and expanding
attack feasibility significantly over that of traditional data
attacks. Techniques to efficiently prevent generalized attacks
by improving state estimation and theoretical analysis of
the performance of our designed approximate algorithms are
directions of our future work in this domain.
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